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Abstract
Background: In an emerging influenza pandemic, estimating severity (the probability of a severe outcome, such as
hospitalization, if infected) is a public health priority. As many influenza infections are subclinical, sero-surveillance is needed
to allow reliable real-time estimates of infection attack rate (IAR) and severity.
Methods and Findings: We tested 14,766 sera collected during the first wave of the 2009 pandemic in Hong Kong using
viral microneutralization. We estimated IAR and infection-hospitalization probability (IHP) from the serial cross-sectional
serologic data and hospitalization data. Had our serologic data been available weekly in real time, we would have obtained
reliable IHP estimates 1 wk after, 1–2 wk before, and 3 wk after epidemic peak for individuals aged 5–14 y, 15–29 y, and
30–59 y. The ratio of IAR to pre-existing seroprevalence, which decreased with age, was a major determinant for the
timeliness of reliable estimates. If we began sero-surveillance 3 wk after community transmission was confirmed, with 150,
350, and 500 specimens per week for individuals aged 5–14 y, 15–19 y, and 20–29 y, respectively, we would have obtained
reliable IHP estimates for these age groups 4 wk before the peak. For 30–59 y olds, even 800 specimens per week would
not have generated reliable estimates until the peak because the ratio of IAR to pre-existing seroprevalence for this age
group was low. The performance of serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance substantially deteriorates if test specificity is not
near 100% or pre-existing seroprevalence is not near zero. These potential limitations could be mitigated by choosing a
higher titer cutoff for seropositivity. If the epidemic doubling time is longer than 6 d, then serial cross-sectional sero-
surveillance with 300 specimens per week would yield reliable estimates when IAR reaches around 6%–10%.
Conclusions: Serial cross-sectional serologic data together with clinical surveillance data can allow reliable real-time
estimates of IAR and severity in an emerging pandemic. Sero-surveillance for pandemics should be considered.
Please see later in the article for the Editors’ Summary.
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Introduction
One of the lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 influenza
(pdmH1N1) pandemic was the need for rapid and reliable
estimates of transmissibility and severity (the probability of severe
outcomes, such as hospitalization and death, if infected) of the
novel virus [1]. This is crucial for public health planning and for
effective communication with the public. Early efforts were
hampered by limited data [2], and while initial estimates of a
basic reproductive number in the range of 1.2–1.6 were consistent
with findings in other countries that were subsequently affected
[3–5], the initial estimate of case-fatality probability of 0.4% now
appears to be substantially overestimated [6,7].
In June 2009, we established a comprehensive serologic survey
of pdmH1N1 in Hong Kong. Facilitated by enhanced local
laboratory capacity developed since the 2003 epidemic of severe
acute respiratory syndrome, Hong Kong used extensive laboratory
testing for pdmH1N1 among all hospitalizations with respiratory
illness throughout the 2009 influenza pandemic. We previously
reported pdmH1N1 infection attack rate (IAR) and severity
estimates using only serologic data collected before and immedi-
ately after the first wave of the pandemic in Hong Kong [7]. A
companion study used paired sera collected from a cohort (1) to
estimate the IAR and severity profile of pdmH1N1 in Hong Kong
and (2) to show that specimens collected around the peak of an
epidemic from larger cohorts could have yielded more reliable
severity estimates [8]. In this paper, we used all available serial
cross-sectional serologic data to investigate how soon we would
have obtained reliable estimates of IAR and infection-hospitaliza-
tion probability (IHP) (the probability of hospitalization if infected)
if these serologic data were available weekly in real-time as the
epidemic unfolded. Having illustrated the principle of serial cross-
sectional sero-surveillance for pdmH1N1, we then conducted
extensive computer simulations to assess its expected performance
and logistical requirements in future pandemics.
This study was organized as follows. First, we described a
convolution-based method for real-time estimation of IAR and
IHP from clinical surveillance and serial cross-sectional serologic
data. The same method has been used to estimate incidence of
pdmH1N1 in England [9,10]. Next, we retrospectively applied this
method to our pdmH1N1 hospitalization and serologic data to
sequentially compute real-time estimates of IHP and IAR that
would have been obtained as the epidemic unfolded. We then
estimated the number of specimens that would have been required
in order to obtain reliable estimates of IHP and IAR 3–4 wk
before the epidemic peak. Finally, we conducted computer
simulations with hypothetical pandemic scenarios to analyze
how the performance of serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance
depends on the characteristics of serologic testing (sensitivity,
specificity, throughput, lead time, titer cutoff, pre-existing
seroprevalence) and epidemic dynamics (basic reproductive
number, generation time, natural history, antibody response
kinetics). Our goal was to provide operational guidelines for
implementing serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance in future
pandemics of influenza and other infectious diseases.
Methods
Clinical Surveillance Data
Age-stratified data on the daily number of virologically con-
firmed outpatient consultations, hospitalizations, intensive care
unit admissions, and deaths associated with pdmH1N1 from 29
April 2009 to 30 November 2009 were provided by the e-flu
database of the Hong Kong Hospital Authority [11,12]. Beginning
May 2009, patients admitted with acute respiratory illnesses
routinely underwent laboratory testing for pdmH1N1 virus, with
laboratory results available typically within 24 h and notification
to the central database typically within 1–2 d [7]. Local pdmH1N1
transmission was identified in mid-June, but containment efforts
enforced until 29 June 2009 required all laboratory-confirmed cases
to be hospitalized for isolation regardless of disease severity, and
therefore only surveillance data from 30 June 2009 onwards were
used in our analysis. In this study, we focused on estimating the IHP,
which was defined as the probability that an infected case (not
necessarily symptomatic) required hospitalization. In our earlier
publication [7], we called this quantity case-hospitalization rate.
Here, we revised the terminology to avoid confusion with the
probability of hospitalization if infected with symptoms (e.g., [6]).
We assumed that IHP was constant from 30 June 2009 onwards.
Seroprevalence Data
Between 12 June 2009 and 30 June 2010, we tested 13,328
serum samples from blood donors (aged 16–59 y), 3,613 from
hospital outpatients (aged 5–90 y), and 917 from participants of a
community pediatric cohort study (aged 5–14 y). Further descrip-
tion of the study design and preliminary analyses of a subset of
these sera collected before and immediately after the first wave of
pdmH1N1 can be found in [7] and Text S1. Sera were tested
for antibody responses to A/California/4/2009 (H1N1) by viral
microneutralization (MN). Our definition of MN titer in our
previous publication [7] and the current study is slightly different
from the latest World Health Organization (WHO) recom-
mendation published in 2011 [13]. We followed the previous
convention in which MN titers were denoted by taking into
account the final dilution resulting from mixing the serum dilution
with the virus. The latest WHO manual for laboratory diagnosis
recommends that the virus titer be denoted as the initial serum
dilution alone [13]. In effect, our MN titers in [7] and the current
study need to be halved when comparing them with those that
follow the latest recommendation (e.g., those in Veguilla et al.
[14], which we used to estimate the antibody response kinetics
parameters for the current study; see below and Text S1 for
details).
We defined pdmH1N1 seropositivity as an MN antibody titer of
$1:40 and pdmH1N1 seroprevalence as the proportion of
individuals who were seropositive. The age-specific seroprevalence
of the three groups of participants were largely similar across time
during the first wave (Figure S1). Estimates of IAR among
pdmH1N1 serology studies from different countries using different
sampling schemes have been quite similar [7,8,15,16]. To build a
model for illustrating the principle of serial cross-sectional sero-
surveillance, we aggregated the seroprevalence data from the three
groups of participants, though we acknowledge that such
aggregation is not generally well-justified in terms of representa-
tiveness. Specimens collected before 30 June 2009 were collec-
tively used to estimate the seroprevalence on 30 June 2009.
Serologic data between 30 June 2009 and 30 November 2009
were grouped into weekly batches, and the collection time of each
batch was set to be the average collection time of its constituents
(i.e., weighted by the number of samples each day). In summary,
serologic data used in this study comprised 14,766 samples
collected from 5–59 y olds before 30 November 2009.
A Convolution-Based Method for Real-Time Estimation of
IAR and Severity
We used a convolution-based method for obtaining real-time
estimates of IHP and IAR from serial cross-sectional serologic data
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and hospitalization data. The same method has been used to
estimate incidence of pdmH1N1 in England [9,10]. A schematic of
this method is shown in Figure 1. The method requires knowing
(1) the cumulative distribution function of the time from illness
onset to hospitalization FHosp, (2) the cumulative distribution
function of time from illness onset to seropositivity FSeropos, and (3)
the proportion of infections that eventually became seropositive, h.
In principle, all these should be directly observable from pandemic
surveillance. The basic algorithm of this method was as follows. At
any time t during the epidemic: (1) Use FHosp to deconvolute daily
hospitalizations h0,…,ht to obtain an unscaled incidence (daily
number of infections) curve a0,…,at [17]. If IHP is known, the true
incidence curve is estimated by dividing a0,…,at by IHP. This step
can be skipped if the actual onset dates of hospitalized cases are
known. (2) Use FSeropos to construct an estimated seroprevalence
curve b0,…,bt from the unscaled incidence curve a0,…,at:
bs~P0z
h
IHP
Xs
u~0
FSeropos(s{u)au, s~0,:::,t: ð1Þ
where P0 is the true pre-pandemic seroprevalence. (3) Fit the
estimated seroprevalence curve b0,…,bt to the serial cross-sectional
serologic data by finding the values of IHP and P0 that maximize
the following likelihood function:
L(IHP,P0)~P
i
Binomial xti ,nti ,bti
 
~P
i
nti !
xti !(nti{xti )!
b
xti
ti
1{bti
 nti{xti
ð2Þ
where the product is over all times ti#t for which cross-sectional
serologic data are available, with each component being the
(binomial) probability of getting xti seropositives from testing nti
samples collected at time ti if the true seroprevalence was bti . IAR
can then be estimated by dividing the unscaled incidence curve by
our maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of IHP.
In this basic algorithm, sensitivity and specificity of serologic
testing were assumed to be 100%. The method can be extended to
incorporate imperfect sensitivity and specificity, temporal variation
in IHP (e.g., weekend and seasonal effects) and different titer
cutoffs for seropositivity. See Text S1 for the generalized algo-
rithm that takes into account these factors. Note that sensitivity
(specificity) here referred to the probability that the result of the
serologic test was positive (negative) if the serum specimen was
truly seropositive (seronegative), regardless of whether seropositiv-
ity was due to pre-existing cross-reactive antibodies or antibodies
generated by recent pandemic infection. Therefore, our definitions
of sensitivity and specificity were different from that in recent
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1. Each infected case becomes seropositive 
    after recovery with probability  θ
2. The probability distribution of delay between 
    illness onset and seropositivity is F Seropos 
1. Each infected case requires 
    hospitalization with probability IHP 
    (infection-hospitalization probability) 
2. The probability distribution of delay between 
    illness onset and hospitalization is  F Hosp 
0 
0 
incidence 
incidence 
hospitalization 
infection 
attack rate 
seroprevalence 
hospitalization 
unscaled 
incidence hospitalization 
unscaled 
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attack rate 
0 
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seroprevalence 
0 
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seroprevalence 
serial cross-sectional 
serologic data 
estimated 
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A 
time 
time 
time 
B Step 1: Deconvolution 
Back-calculate unscaled incidence from hospitalization data using FHosp  
Step 2: Convolution 
Calculate unscaled seroprevalence from unscaled incidence using θ and FSeropos  
time time 
time time 
time time 
Step 3: Statistical inference of IHP 
   
   True seroprevalence = Pre-existing seroprevalence + 
Find the best value of IHP and pre-existing seroprevalence that fit sero-
prevalence curve to serial cross-sectional serologic data using maximum likelihood.
Divide unscaled incidence by the estimated IHP to obtain incidence. 
unscaled seroprevalence 
IHP 
Figure 1. A schematic of the convolution-based method for real-time estimation of IHP and IAR from hospitalization and serial
cross-sectional serologic data. (A) The hospitalization (top) and seroprevalence (bottom) curves are both delayed and scaled transformations of
the incidence curve (middle). (B) By performing the reverse transformations, we can use hospitalization and seroprevalence data to reconstruct
incidence and estimate IHP and IAR in real time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001103.g001
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related publications on the performance of pdmH1N1 serologic
assays in which sensitivity was defined as the probability of a
positive serologic result among infected individuals and specificity
the probability of a negative serologic result among uninfected
individuals [14,18].
A Model for Retrospective Real-Time Estimation of
pdmH1N1 IHP and IAR
When retrospectively applying the convolution-based method
to our pdmH1N1 data, we made the following model
specifications. (1) IAR and IHP were estimated for the following
age groups for ease of comparison with our previous study [7]:
5–14, 15–19, 20–29, 30–39, and 40–59 y. (2) Sensitivity and
specificity were 100% for serologic testing for MN titer $1:40. (3)
Serologic results for each batch of specimens were available
3 d after the last sample of that batch was collected; ti in the
likelihood function of Step 3 in the basic algorithm was defined to
be the average collection time of the specimens contained in the
ith batch. (4) For simplicity, we ignored the delay between
infection and illness onset (around 1 d). Incorporating this delay
would essentially shift the estimated incidence curve to the left by
the length of the delay. (5) The upper-bound of age-specific IHP
at time t was the cumulative number of hospitalizations divided
by the cumulative number of confirmed cases up to time t for that
age group. Similarly, the lower-bound was the cumulative
number of hospitalizations divided by the size of that age group.
(6) The cumulative distribution function of the time from illness
onset to hospitalization FHosp was based on those hospitalized
cases whose onset dates were available in our clinical surveillance
data (Figure 2A). (7) The proportion of infected individuals who
eventually became seropositive h and the cumulative distribution
function of the time from illness onset to seropositivity FSeropos
were estimated using published data on the kinetics of antibody
response among laboratory-confirmed pdmH1N1 cases in the
United States [14]. To simplify our analysis, we assumed that
FSeropos was an Erlang-10 distribution with mean mSeropos and
constructed a likelihood LA(h, mSeropos) for these antibody
response data (results were almost identical when Erlang-5, -20,
or -40 was used instead; see Text S1 for details). The resulting
MLEs were h=1 and mSeropos = 9.6 d. However, given the
modest sample size of this study, these estimates were associated
with significant uncertainty (Figure 2B and 2C). To incorporate
such uncertainty into our real-time estimates of IAR and IHP, we
modified the convolution-based method to estimate IHP, P0, h,
and FSeropos simultaneously by redefining the likelihood as the
product of L(IHP, P0) in Step 3 above and LA(h, mSeropos). Our
premise was that antibody response data of similar sample size
and precisions could have been obtained in real-time during the
early phase of the pandemic from serologic follow-up of the first
virologically confirmed cases [9]. We defined the full model as the
estimates of IHP, P0, h, and FSeropos obtained from the full set of
hospitalization and serial cross-sectional serologic data (i.e., up to
30 November 2009).
In this model, our IAR estimate would be accurate if and only
if our IHP estimate was accurate. As such, for conciseness, we
focus on the latter when presenting our results. When evaluating
the reliability of sequential real-time estimates of IHP, we used
the full model as the reference for comparison, i.e., we assumed
that the full model gave accurate estimates of the true IHP. In
this context, we regarded a real-time IHP estimate as reliable if
(1) its MLE did not differ from the MLE in the full model by
more than 50% and (2) its interquartile range (IQR) was less than
three times its MLE.
Serial Cross-Sectional Sero-Surveillance for Future
Pandemics
To assess the logistical requirements and expected performance
of serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance for future pandemics, we
first estimated the number of specimens that would have allowed
reliable estimates of IHP for pdmH1N1 by mid-August 2009 (4 wk
before the epidemic peak), assuming that the incidence and
seroprevalence curves in the full model were accurate. We
simulated 300 stochastic realizations of serial cross-sectional
sero-surveillance in which (1) m pre-pandemic specimens were
used to estimate seroprevalence on 30 June 2009 and (2) m
specimens were collected and tested every week starting in the
fourth week of July 2009 (3 wk after community transmission was
confirmed). Sequential real-time estimates of IHP were then
computed using the convolution-based method. We searched for
0
0.35 Age 5 to 14
n = 2129
mean = 2.1
0
0.35 Age 15 to 19
n = 571
mean = 2.2
0
0.35 Age 20 to 29
n = 475
mean = 2.4
0
0.35 Age 30 to 39
n = 269
mean = 2.7
0 5 10
0
0.35
Days
Age 40 to 59
n = 589
mean = 2.5
A                    B
            
      C
θ
Days
FSeropos mean
FSeropos std dev
0.9 1
0 5 10 15
 
 
Figure 2. Time delay from illness onset to hospitalization,
proportion of infected cases who reached seropositivity, and
time delay from illness onset to seropositivity. (A) Probability
density functions of the age-specific delay between illness onset and
hospitalization as observed in the e-flu database surveillance data. Black
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. (B and C) Statistical analysis of
published data on the kinetics of pdmH1N1 antibody response among
laboratory-confirmed cases in the US [14]. Posterior distributions were
obtained using Markov chain Monte Carlo method with non-
informative priors (red lines); see Text S1 for details. (B) The posterior
distribution of the proportion of laboratory-confirmed cases who
eventually developed MN titer $1:40. (C) The posterior distributions of
the mean and standard deviation of the delay between illness onset
and seropositivity assuming that the delay distribution FSeropos was
Erlang-10.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001103.g002
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the smallest value of m for each age group that would yield reliable
estimates of IHP by mid-August.
Next, we conducted simulations with hypothetical epidemic
scenarios in order to analyze the general behavior of serial cross-
sectional sero-surveillance. We first considered susceptible-infect-
ed-removed epidemic dynamics with a basic reproductive number
of R0 = 1.4, mean generation time of Tg = 2.5 d, IHP=0.5%, and
Erlang-3 probability distribution for the infectious duration with
mean 2Tgw/(1 + w) = 3.75 d, where w=3 is the number of Erlang
stages [19,20]. We assumed that the probability distribution FHosp
was the same as that in our pdmH1N1 model (Figure 2A). We
assumed that 100 sera with collection times uniformly distributed
between 1 and 28 d after symptom onset were available for
estimating h and FSeropos (as in model specification number 7 for
pdmH1N1 above; see Text S1 for details). We simulated serial
cross-sectional sero-surveillance with 300 serum samples per week
starting 28 d after 50 infections were seeded in a population of 1
million. The 28 d of delay after seeding was meant to reflect the
time needed to develop a reliable serologic assay and to set up the
sero-surveillance operations. We simulated the following scenarios
to study the effect of sensitivity and specificity of serologic testing,
pre-existing seroprevalence, and alternative titer cutoff for
seropositivity: (A) 100% sensitivity, 100% specificity, no pre-
existing seroprevalence, h=1, and FSeropos of Erlang-10 with mean
9.6 d (i.e., same as the MLEs for the US antibody response data);
(B) same as scenario A but with 80% sensitivity; (C) same as
scenario A but with 95% specificity; (D) same as scenario A but
with 5% pre-existing seroprevalence; (E) same as scenario A but
with a higher titer cutoff for seropositivity such that h=0.6 and the
mean of FSeropos increased by 50%.
Finally, to investigate the dependence on epidemic dynamics,
we simulated serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance in 100
epidemic scenarios that were randomly generated using Latin-
hypercube sampling of the following parameter space: R0 between
1.2 and 2; Tg between 2 and 4 d; IHP between 0.1% and 3%; the
probability distribution of infectious duration Erlang-k, k=1, …,5;
population size between 250,000 and 2.5 million; h between 0.6
and 1; and FSeropos gamma with mean between 6 and 16 d and
coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean)
between 0.1 and 0.6. Both the mean and standard deviation of
FSeropos were included for statistical inference, i.e., this was a
relaxation of our previous Erlang-10 assumption for FSeropos.
For each of these epidemic scenarios, we compared the performance
of sero-surveillance under the following operational conditions: (1) sero-
surveillance begun 28 d after seeding, with 150, 300, and 450
specimens per week; (2) sero-surveillance begun 14, 28, and 42 d after
seeding, with 300 specimens per week.
Ethics Committee Approval
All study protocols were approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Hong Kong/Hospital Authority Hong
Kong West Cluster.
Results
Seroprevalence, IHP, and Final IAR in the Full Model
The age-specific seroprevalence curves in the full model
provided a reasonably good fit to the serial cross-sectional
serologic data (Figure 3) except for the first 2 wk of September
for 5–14 y olds. For this period, seroprevalence in the full model
was substantially higher than the proportion of seropositive sera in
the data. This discrepancy was likely due to the small number of
serum specimens available in these 2 wk (17 and 26). Age-specific
IHP and final IAR in the full model were mostly similar to our
previous estimates, which were based on only pre- and post-first-
wave sera (Table 1). The largest discrepancy was that the final IAR
for 15–19 y olds in the full model was 9% higher than our previous
estimate. However, this was expected because of the inclusion of
outpatient sera in the full model but not in our previous estimates.
As noted in our previous study [7] and Text S1, the post-first-wave
seroprevalence of outpatients was substantially higher than that of
blood donors for this age group, hence the higher final IAR in the
full model.
Retrospective Sequential Real-Time Estimates of IHP and
IAR for pdmH1N1
Had our serologic data been available weekly in real time,
reliable estimates of IHP would have been available in early
October 2009 for 5–14 y olds, early September 2009 for 15–29 y
olds, and mid-October 2009 for 30–59 y olds (Figure 3). These
time points corresponded to 1 wk after, 1–2 wk before, and 3 wk
after the epidemic peak. For the 5–14 y olds, reliable estimate of
IHP would not have been available before the peak because the
number of serum specimens was small and collection of sera did
not begin until 3 wk before the peak for this age group. For the
30–59 y olds, reliable estimate of IHP would not have been
available until the first wave was almost over because the final IAR
was comparable in magnitude to the pre-existing seroprevalence
for this age group. That is, the signal-to-background ratio was
small, which required a larger number of sera (relative to the
average of 200–300 specimens per week in our study; see Figure 3)
in order to accurately detect the increase in seroprevalence
generated by pandemic infections (see below for further analysis
and discussions). The sequential real-time estimates of IHP
exhibited the following patterns: (1) the MLE zoomed to the
correct order of magnitude upon the first cross-section of serologic
data for which seroprevalence was apparently above pre-pandemic
level, and (2) the confidence intervals widened upon each cross-
section of serologic data for which seroprevalence was lower than
the most up-to-date estimate in the model, e.g., because of
statistical noise associated with sampling.
Had we begun weekly sero-surveillance in the fourth week of
July 2009, we would have needed around 150, 350, and 500
specimens per week for 5–14 y olds, 15–19 y olds, and 20–29 y
olds in order to obtain reliable estimates of IHP for these age
groups by mid-August 2009 (Figure S2). For the 30–59 y olds,
even a prohibitively large sample size of 800 per week would not
have provided reliable estimates of IHP until mid- to late
September 2009 because of the low ratio of IAR to pre-existing
seroprevalence for these age groups.
Serial Cross-Sectional Sero-Surveillance for Future
Pandemics
In the simulated base case (Figure 4, scenario A), serial cross-
sectional sero-surveillance with 300 specimens per week yielded
reliable estimates of IHP when the true seroprevalence was around
1%. With 100% of infected cases becoming seropositive 9.6 d after
illness onset on average (Figure 2B and 2C), IAR was around 6%
when seroprevalence was around 1%. This correspondence
between IAR and seroprevalence was robust across epidemic
model structure and parameter values (see Text S1 and Figure S3).
The performance of serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance was
largely unaffected even when the sensitivity of serologic testing was
only 80% (Figure 4, scenario B). However, the performance
substantially deteriorated if the specificity of serologic testing
dropped from 100% to 95% (Figure 4, scenario C) or pre-existing
seroprevalence increased from 0% to 5% (Figure 4, scenario D).
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Table 1. Comparison of the estimates of IHP and IAR in the full model with those from our previous study, which used only the
pre- and post-first-wave sera [7].
Age Group IHP IAR
Full Model Pre- and Post-First-Wave Sera [7] Full Model Pre- and Post-First-Wave Sera [7]
5–14 y 0.80% (0.73%–0.88%) 0.84% (0.76%–0.97%) 44.0% (40.8%–47.3%) 43.4% (37.9%–47.6%)
15–19 y 0.46% (0.37%–0.62%) 0.77% (0.53%–1.50%) 25.0% (19.7%–30.1%) 15.8% (8.2%–22.1%)
20–29 y 0.39% (0.32%–0.48%) 0.47% (0.37%–0.66%) 13.4% (11.3%–15.6%) 11.8% (8.4%–14.7%)
30–39 y 0.57% (0.39%–1.06%) 0.80% (0.45%–3.66%) 5.8% (3.6%–8.1%) 4.3% (0.9%–7.5%)
40–59 y 0.69% (0.48%–1.24%) 0.61% (0.38%–1.07%) 3.9% (2.5%–5.4%) 5.0% (2.7%–7.4%)
Full model results are MLE (95% confidence interval); pre- and post-first-wave sera results are posterior mode (95% credible interval).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001103.t001
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Figure 3. Hospitalization data, serial cross-sectional serologic data, and sequential real-time estimates of IHP and IAR for pdmH1N1
in Hong Kong. Each tick on the x-axis indicates the first day of the months July through December 2009. The first row shows the daily number of
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after the last sample of that batch was collected.
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This was because reliable estimation of IHP was mainly limited by
how soon we could accurately detect an increase in seroprevalence
generated by pandemic infections. When this signal was weak (i.e.,
during the early pandemic stage), accurate detection would be
difficult when test specificity was low (i.e., with false positives
decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio) or when pre-existing sero-
prevalence was not close to zero (i.e., the signal-to-background
ratio was small). These limitations could be mitigated by increasing
the titer cutoff for seropositivity. For example, serologic follow-up
of 881 and 79 virologically confirmed pdmH1N1 cases in Hong
Kong and the US found that around 57% and 94% of cases
developed MN titer $1:80 [14,21]. With the seropositivity cutoff
set to MN titer 1:40 and 1:80, the pre-existing seroprevalence in
our serosurvey was 3%–5% and ,0.2%, respectively [7].
Increasing the cutoff for seropositivity at the expense of decreasing
the proportion of infected cases seropositive (h) from 1 to 0.6 and
increasing the mean delay from illness onset to seropositivity (the
mean of FSeropos) by 50% from 9.6 d to 14.5 d would only slightly
delay the timeliness of accurate estimates of IHP (Figure 4,
scenario E).
The performance of serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance
depended on epidemic dynamics mostly via the epidemic doubling
time (Figure 5). In general, if the epidemic doubling time was
longer than 6 d, serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance with 300
serum specimens per week provided accurate estimates of IHP
when h6IAR reached around 6%. In this range of doubling time,
the performance of sero-surveillance was largely similar when the
delay between the start of sero-surveillance and epidemic seeding
varied from 14 to 42 d. Given that the average delay from illness
onset to seropositivity was around 9.6 d, it would be impossible for
serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance to yield accurate estimates of
IHP during the nascent stage of the epidemic if the epidemic
doubling time was very short (Figure 5). The public health need for
early severity estimates to inform situational awareness and
pandemic response thus further highlights the importance of
aggressive mitigation measures to slow the spread of disease during
the early stages of a pandemic.
Discussion
Our results suggest that had our serial cross-sectional serologic
data been available weekly in real time during the 2009 influenza
pandemic, reliable estimates of IAR and IHP could have been
obtained 1 wk after, 1–2 wk before, and 3 wk after the epidemic
peak for 5–14 y olds, 15–29 y olds, and 30–59 y olds, respectively.
The ratio of IAR to pre-existing seroprevalence (the signal-to-
background ratio), which decreased with age for pdmH1N1 in
2009, was a major determinant of the timeliness of reliable
estimates. The 2009 pandemic provided a particular challenge
from the point of view of serologic interpretation because it was
caused by a virus subtype that was previously endemic in humans.
This led to the presence of serologic cross-reactivity and therefore
significant pre-existing seroprevalence at MN titer $1:40,
especially in the older age groups, hence the lack of timeliness of
reliable IHP estimates in our retrospective analysis. This would
have been much less of a problem with the pandemics of 1957
(H2N2) and 1968 (H3N2) or a future pandemic of H5N1. With
H9N2 viruses, the challenge posed by serologic cross-reactions
may be comparable to that with pdmH1N1 because a proportion
of individuals born before 1968 appear to have cross-reactive
antibodies [22]. Our results suggest that for serial cross-sectional
sero-surveillance to yield timely and accurate estimates of IAR and
severity, pre-existing seroprevalence needs be adjusted to near zero
by choosing a sufficiently high titer cutoff for seropositivity. Given
our limited serologic testing capacity, we only screened our
specimens at MN titers of $1:40 and $1:20, without determining
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the exact antibody titer for each specimen. The performance of
serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance might be enhanced if exact
titers were available and incorporated into the real-time estimation
of IHP. If hemagglutination inhibition rather than the more labor
intensive MN tests were used (which may be feasible with some
pandemic viruses), the logistical feasibility and performance of
sero-surveillance may be further enhanced, although for pdmH1N1
the MN test was more sensitive and specific to confirmed infection
[23]. Automation of serologic assays may increase feasibility of
large-scale serology in the future.
The 2009 influenza pandemic highlighted the need for
improved methods of rapid, reliable assessment of transmissibility
and severity for an unfolding infectious disease outbreak. The
Fineberg et al. [24] report on the performance of WHO during the
pandemic highlighted the lack of ‘‘a consistent, measurable and
understandable depiction of severity’’ as one of the shortcomings
of the response in 2009, and called for proper timely assessment of
severity to guide public health response. Real-time transmission
modeling methods have previously been devised to estimate IAR
and severity based on clinical surveillance data without the use of
serologic data [25,26]. Their performance depends on the
reliability of the underlying transmission model, e.g., assumptions
and data regarding contact patterns between age groups, medical
consultation rates, and pre-existing immunity. In this study, we
showed that serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance could comple-
ment these methods to allow timely and accurate real-time
estimates of IAR and severity.
While the ideal sero-surveillance study would draw from a
random sample of the population of interest, in practice this is
unlikely to be feasible. In our study there was good agreement
between specimens collected from blood donors, hospital outpa-
tients, and community participants. A companion community-
based cohort study with paired serologic data in Hong Kong also
gave similar seroprevalence estimates [8]. Our study and other
similar serologic studies [16,27–29] have demonstrated that sero-
surveillance is feasible and that the resulting information could
provide invaluable data for accurate and timely estimation of
population attack rates and disease severity. However, sero-
surveillance does require substantial laboratory infrastructure and
resources, and during a pandemic there may be competing
concerns for laboratory services such as diagnostic testing and
vaccine development. As in our case, involvement of academic
research centers, which are less likely to be under pressure to
provide front-line diagnostic services, may provide a feasible
solution. The total cost of our serologic study was around 1% of
the amount that Hong Kong spent on purchasing pdmH1N1
vaccines, whereas the information provided by our study has been
instrumental in informing pandemic situational awareness and
decisions for prioritizing vaccine target groups in Hong Kong.
In addition to having a reliable serologic assay, serologic follow-
up of laboratory-confirmed cases needs to be conducted as early as
possible during a pandemic in order to collect acute- and
convalescence-phase sera for characterizing the kinetics of
antibody response against the pandemic virus (h and FSeropos)
[14]. Kinetics of antibody response may be strain-specific. For
example, Buchy et al. [30] analyzed 44 sera from 11 patients with
H5N1 disease and found that no neutralizing antibodies were
detected during the first week after disease onset, while 70% and
80% had MN titer $1:80 2 and 3 wk after disease onset. Togo
et al. [31] analyzed sera from seven individuals who were
experimentally challenged with the A2/Hong Kong strain
(WHO strain designation A2/University of Maryland/1/70) and
found that 0%, 57%, and 100% had neutralization titer $1:32 1,
2, and 3 wk after exposure [31]. Our study suggests that serologic
follow-up of around 100 cases for 28 d would be sufficient for
supporting sero-surveillance.
Our study has several limitations. First, our serologic specimens
were collected via convenience sampling of blood donors, hospital
outpatients, and vaccine trial participants. As such, our serologic
data did not necessarily provide a representative description of
pdmH1N1 seroprevalence in the general population. However,
our estimates of age-specific IARs were similar to those in a
Epidemic doubling time (days)
Th
e 
pr
od
uc
t o
f θ
 a
nd
 IA
R
 w
he
n
IH
P 
es
tim
at
es
 b
ec
am
e 
re
lia
bl
e
150 specimens/wk
300 specimens/wk
450 specimens/wk
42 days of delay
28 days of delay
14 days of delay
1.5 3 6 12 24
1%
5%
10%
50%
100%
1.5 3 6 12 24
Figure 5. Performance of serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance in 100 randomly generated epidemic scenarios. All x- and y-axes are
in log-scale. For each scenario, 200 stochastic realizations of serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance were simulated. (A) Sero-surveillance begun 28 d
after epidemic seeding with 150 (red), 300 (green), and 450 (blue) specimens per week. (B) Sero-surveillance begun 42 (red), 28 (green), and 14 (blue)
d after epidemic seeding with 300 specimens per week. Points represent the mean (among the 200 realizations) of h6 IAR at the threshold where a
reliable estimate of IHP was obtained (defined as the stage of epidemic after which [1] all subsequent MLEs of IHP were within 50% of the true value
and [2] all subsequent IQR-to-MLE ratios were less than three) in a given epidemic scenario; circles and triangles indicate that the reliable IHP estimate
was obtained before and after the epidemic peak, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001103.g005
Estimating Severity of Pandemic Influenza
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 8 October 2011 | Volume 8 | Issue 10 | e1001103
companion serologic study in Hong Kong that was based on
paired-sera from households recruited using random digit-dialing
of landlines [8]. Second, we assumed that the proportion of
pdmH1N1 cases that eventually developed MN titer $1:40 was
similar to that observed in serologic follow-up of virologically
confirmed cases who reported symptoms [14,21]. It is not known
whether asymptomatic cases were equally likely to develop MN
titer, so our estimates of IAR and IHP would need to be revised if
new data on this became available. Third, during a pandemic, the
reporting delay of clinical surveillance data and the laboratory
capacity available for serologic testing are subject to considerable
uncertainty. In our model, we assumed that these factors were not
the rate-limiting steps for serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance
(the number of specimens needed and pre-existing seroprevalence
were the primary limiting factors). Finally, we have considered
only the serial cross-sectional design for sero-surveillance. An
alternative design is cohort-based sero-surveillance, in which sera
from the same individuals are collected at various time points
during a pandemic, and IARs are inferred from seroconversion
rates (i.e., using paired serology) [8]. While the performance of the
latter design may have the advantage of being relatively insensitive
to pre-existing seroprevalence, it is not obvious how to optimally
time the collection of sera from the cohort for real-time
surveillance during a pandemic (because regular or frequent blood
sampling of the same individuals is unlikely to be feasible). We plan
to compare the serial cross-sectional design with the cohort-based
design in future studies.
In conclusion, we estimated that if the pre-existing seropreva-
lence could be adjusted to near zero with around h=60%–100%
of infected cases reaching seropositivity 6–16 d after symptom
onset on average, then serial cross-sectional sero-surveillance with
about 300 specimens per week would allow reliable estimates of
IHP and IAR as soon as h6 IAR reached around 6% (Figure 5).
This level of testing capacity should be logistically feasible for most
developed countries if sero-surveillance is a formal part of
pandemic surveillance. Once an accurate estimate of IAR is
available, reliable estimates for other severity measures such as the
probability of intensive care unit admission or death given
infection can then be easily obtained. Once reliable severity
estimates have been obtained for a high-priority group, testing
capacity could then be allocated to other groups. Concentrated
efforts to gather such data from one of the major cities affected
early in the course of a pandemic would potentially yield data that
is of global relevance for public health. Such strategies would be
useful not only for situational awareness of influenza pandemics
but also for pandemics caused by other pathogens, e.g., a future
SARS-like event. As such, serologic surveillance should be
considered in updated plans for influenza pandemic preparedness
and response and for other pandemics.
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Figure S1 Age-specific proportions of individuals with
antibody titers $1:40 by viral MN in Hong Kong since
June 2009.Markers and vertical bars indicate the MLE and 95%
confidence intervals of weekly seroprevalence estimated using the
exact binomial method applied to weekly serologic data. Data
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Every winter, millions of people catch
influenza—a viral infection of the airways—and about half
a million die as a result. These seasonal epidemics occur
because small but frequent changes in the influenza virus
mean that the immune response produced by infection with
one year’s virus provides only partial protection against the
next year’s virus. Occasionally, however, a very different
influenza virus emerges to which people have virtually no
immunity. Such viruses can start global epidemics
(pandemics) and kill millions of people. The most recent
influenza pandemic began in March 2009 in Mexico, when
the first case of influenza caused by a new virus called
pandemic A/H1N1 2009 (pdmH1N1) occurred. The virus
spread rapidly despite strenuous efforts by national and
international public health agencies to contain it, and on 11
June 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared
that an influenza pandemic was underway. By the time WHO
announced that the pandemic was over (10 August 2010),
pdmH1N1 had killed more than 18,000 people.
Why Was This Study Done? Early in the 2009 influenza
pandemic, as in any emerging pandemic, reliable estimates
of pdmH1N1’s transmissibility (how easily it spreads between
people) and severity (the proportion of infected people who
needed hospital treatment) were urgently needed to help
public health officials plan their response to the pandemic
and advise the public about the threat to their health.
Because infection with an influenza virus does not always
make people ill, the only way to determine the true size and
severity of an influenza outbreak is to monitor the
occurrence of antibodies (proteins made by the immune
system in response to infections) to the influenza virus in the
population—so-called serologic surveillance. In this study,
the researchers developed a method that uses serologic data
to provide real-time estimates of the infection attack rate
(IAR; the cumulative occurrence of new infections in a
population) and the infection-hospitalization probability
(IHP; the proportion of affected individuals that needs to
be hospitalized) during an influenza pandemic.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
tested nearly 15,000 serum samples collected in Hong Kong
during the first wave of the 2009 pandemic for antibodies to
pdmH1N1 and then used a mathematical approach called
convolution to estimate IAR and IHP from these serologic
data and hospitalization data. They report that if the
serological data had been available weekly in real time,
they would have been able to obtain reliable estimates of
IAR and IHP by one week after, one to two weeks before, and
three weeks after the pandemic peak for 5–14 year olds, 15–
29 year olds, and 30–59 year olds, respectively. If serologic
surveillance had begun three weeks after confirmation of
community transmission of pdmH1N1, sample sizes of 150,
350, and 500 specimens per week from 5–14 year olds, 15–19
year olds, and 20–29 year olds, respectively, would have
been sufficient to obtain reliable IAR and IHP estimates four
weeks before the pandemic peak. However, for 30–59 year
olds, even 800 specimens per week would not have
generated reliable estimates because of pre-existing
antibodies to an H1N1 virus in this age group. Finally,
computer simulations of future pandemics indicate that
serologic surveillance with 300 serum specimens per week
would yield reliable estimates of IAR and IHP as soon as the
true IAR reached about 6%.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest
that serologic data together with clinical surveillance data
could be used to provide reliable real-time estimates of IARs
and severity in an emerging influenza pandemic. Although
the number of samples needed to provide accurate
estimates of IAR and IHP in real life may vary somewhat
from those reported here because of limitations in the
design of this study, these findings nevertheless suggest that
the level of testing capacity needed to provide real-time
estimates of IAR and IHP during an emerging influenza
pandemic should be logistically feasible for most developed
countries. Moreover, collection of serologic surveillance data
from any major city affected early in an epidemic could
potentially provide information of global relevance for public
health. Thus, the researchers conclude, serologic monitoring
should be included in future plans for influenza pandemic
preparedness and response and in planning for other
pandemics.
Additional Information. Please access these websites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001103.
N A recent PLoS Medicine Research Article by Riley et al.
provides further information on patterns of infection with
the pdmH1N1 virus
N The Hong Kong Centre for Health Protection provides
information on pandemic H1N1 influenza
N The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
provides information about influenza patients and profes-
sionals, including specific information on H1N1 influenza
N Flu.gov, a US government website, provides access to
information on seasonal, pandemic, and H1N1 influenza
N WHO provides information on seasonal influenza and has
information on the global response to H1N1 influenza (in
several languages)
N The UK Health Protection Agency provides information on
pandemic influenza and on H1N1 influenza
N More information for patients about H1N1 influenza is
available through Choices, an information resource pro-
vided by the UK National Health Service
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